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Abstract: The purpose of an Acceptable Flood Capacity (AFC) assessment is to determine whether a 
dam can or cannot pass the AFC. If not, necessary upgrades and timing must be provided so the AFC 
is met. It was found that both the Rosewood and Marburg detention basins cannot pass the AFC. They 
require raising the embankment crest and the installation of a wave wall. In addition to raising the 
embankment, the Marburg basin needs investigation of various additional spillway configurations. The 
paper describes the background to dam safety practice in Australia (with particular reference to 
Queensland), the hydraulic design of these high hazard basins, the basis for determining the AFC of 
each basin and the way forward. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Most of the world's towns and cities evolved on river floodplains. Recent catastrophic flooding in the 
United Kingdom, the Continent and the United States of America is a consequence of that 
development, exacerbated by forest attrition and the expansion of impervious areas in catchments. 
Brisbane suffered disastrous flooding in 1974, after which Wivenhoe Dam was constructed with 
approximately 1.4 GL of flood storage above 1.2 GL of water supply capacity. 36000 people dwell 
within the failure inundation zone below the dam. At the local urban level, flood detention basins have 
become commonplace. The majority are small, pose no threat to human life and are not prescribed or 
regulated by any dam safety authority. 
 
Parsons Brinckerhoff was engaged by Ipswich City Council to undertake Acceptable Flood Capacity 
assessments of Council’s two detention basins that are classified as Regulated Dams. The basins are 
located at Rosewood and Marburg, which are regional townships approximately 20 km west of Ipswich 
City. Rosewood and Marburg have populations of about 2200 and 600, respectively (ABS, 2014). 
 
In Australia, dam safety is a State or Territory matter. In Queensland, The Water Supply (Safety and 
Reliability) Act (2008) covers the administration of dam safety. The Director of Dam Safety in the 
Department of Energy and Water Supply exercises the authority to set design, operational and safety 
management criteria. 
 
Ipswich City Council has an obligation to ensure that any of its dams that pose a potential threat to the 
community have adequate spillway capacity to provide appropriate immunity against overtopping of 
any embankment. It is in this regard that the Director of Dam Safety directed Ipswich City Council to 
prepare Acceptable Flood Capacity assessments for both of its Regulated Dams to determine if either 
requires an upgrade. 
1.1. Basis of existing flood capacity 
The criteria applied to dam characteristics are more onerous the larger the dam and the more likely it 
is that people downstream are placed at risk should the dam fail. A key instrument is the spillway 
design flood Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP). Guidelines provided by the department nominate 
the required AEP range corresponding to various levels of the consequences of dam failure. In 
Queensland the measure of failure consequences is population at risk (PAR), which is determined by 
undertaking a Failure Impact Assessment (FIA). An FIA involves a series of hydraulic analyses to 
 estimate the number of dwellings and other facilities inundated by a breach wave. Rosewood and 
Marburg Detention Basins have consequence categories that justify a spillway design flood equivalent 
to the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF). 
 
At Marburg, the adoption of the PMF would have involved prohibitive cost because of the upstream 
impact on homesteads and an adjacent road, and accordingly, the detention basin would not have 
been constructed. In a guideline on risk assessment (ANCOLD, 2000a), a fallback approach is 
available, being a design flood capacity that makes the risk "as low as reasonably practicable" 
(ALARP). Under ALARP, a flood of 1 in 50,000 AEP was proposed and was accepted by the regulator. 
The basin was put to the test during a 1 in 100 AEP flood event in 2008 after which a State 
Emergency Service spokesperson asserted that, without the detention basin, lives would have been 
lost. This vindicated the ALARP concept. For Rosewood, the spillway design flood is the PMF that can 
be accommodated economically, there being no upstream impact of a large flood rise above spillway 
level. 
1.2. Basis for Acceptable Flood Capacity 
The Acceptable Flood Capacity is defined as: 
 
The overall flood discharge capacity required of a dam determined in accordance 
with these guidelines including freeboard as relevant, which is required to pass the 
critical duration storm event without causing failure of the dam. 
(DNRW, 2007) 
 
Based on respective PAR of 140 and 173, the hazard category of Rosewood and Marburg basins is 
‘High A' according to DNRW (2007). The AFC for each basin is therefore the Probable Maximum 
Precipitation (PMP) design flood. 
 
The Office of the Water Supply Regulator required an Acceptable Flood Capacity (AFC) assessment 
be prepared for the basins. The AFC reports must include an assessment of the identified current 
flood discharge capacity of the dam expressed as a percentage of the required AFC, of the form: 
 
K (%) = Peak discharge for flood currently able to be safely passed 
Peak inflow for the critical duration AFC (1) 
 
Where the dam cannot pass the AFC, the report is to include preliminary proposals for the necessary 
work and timing required to upgrade the dam to the AFC. 
 
The assessment is to be undertaken according to the Guidelines on Acceptable Flood Capacity for 
Dams (DNRW, 2007). For the Marburg basin, this guideline supersedes the ALARP approach that was 
adopted for the basin’s design. The guideline presents three methods for assessing AFC: the Small 
Dams Standard, the Fall-back Option and the comprehensive Risk Assessment Procedure. The Fall-
back option is intended for larger dams where the cost of undertaking a full risk assessment is not 
warranted when weighed against the potential benefits, and is used for the Rosewood and Marburg 
basins. The guideline includes a schedule of dam safety upgrades, reproduced in Appendix A. 
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The crest of a dam wall is set at a level sufficiently higher than the spillway crest as to contain the 
maximum pond water level during the design flood without overtopping. For a dam impounding water, 
the inclusion of a net freeboard between maximum pond level and the dam crest is customary. This 
freeboard allows for wind induced wave action and, for major dams, seismic activity and possibly 
reservoir landslides. 
 
For small flood detention basins with minimal or no impounded water, wave action can be ignored 
because the storage would be at peak flood level for only a limited time and the consequences of dam 
failure are negligible. For larger basins with PAR downstream, the regulatory position is not as clear. 
 
 The Australian National Committee on Large Dams (ANCOLD) is the peer technical association of 
dam owners, safety regulators and consultants, contractors and academics involved in the dams 
industry. A guideline being developed currently by an ANCOLD sub-committee will cover flood 
detention basins. The sub-committee chair indicated to one author that a wave freeboard requirement 
had not previously been considered but may be warranted for basins with PAR. 
 
For a detention basin, blockage of the outlet works is considered a greater risk than crest damage 
from wave action, which involves no continuous flow and would be of short duration. Accordingly, the 
authors argued that a freeboard allowance, if required, should be applied not to any intermediate 
upgrade, but only to the non-overflow crest behind which the peak storage level rise corresponding to 
Acceptable Flood Capacity is fully contained. As explained below, the Regulator accepted this 
proposition. 
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF ROSEWOOD AND MARBURG DETENTION BASINS 
The catchment, embankment, outlet structures and storage information of Rosewood and Marburg 
Detention Basins are listed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Characteristics of Rosewood and Marburg Detention Basins 
 
Item Rosewood Detention Basin Marburg Detention Basin 
Catchment area, land use 
and hydrology 
1.36 km2, rural, steep, rough 
terrain, narrow catchment 
16.04 km2, rural, gently sloping, 
grassed, wide catchment flanked 
by hills 
Embankment type Homogenous compacted earth-fill Homogenous compacted earth-fill 
Maximum population at risk > 140 173 
Crest level of spillway RL 79.90 RL 86.70 
Crest level of embankment RL 81.70 RL 89.20 
Embankment height 9.70 m 10.70 m 
Spillway crest length 28.00 m 45.00 m 
Embankment crest length 388 m 725 m 
Storage capacity (to spillway 
crest) 
117 ML 1145 ML 
Storage capacity (to 
embankment crest) 
211 ML 2650 ML 
Pipe outlets (diameter pipe) 1 x 1050 mm, 1 x 900 mm 4 x 1800 mm 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show aerial views of the features of the two detention basins. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Aerial photo and feature locations of the Rosewood Detention Basin 
  
Figure 2 - Aerial photo and feature locations of the Marburg Detention Basin 
4. ACCEPTABLE FLOOD CAPACITY ASSESSMENT OF ROSEWOOD 
DETENTION BASIN 
4.1. Background 
Rosewood Detention Basin, completed in January 2002, is situated on an unnamed tributary of 
Western Creek, a tributary of the Bremer River. 
 
The purpose of the basin is to attenuate peak flows to protect the township of Rosewood during large 
storms. The basin is designed such that the spillway is not overtopped for all storms up to the 1 in 100 
AEP event. 
 
The Rosewood Detention Basin is classified as a Hazard Category 2 structure under the Water Act 
2000 and the Queensland Dam Safety Management Guidelines (DNRM, 2002). This Category applies 
for an embankment breach where more than 100 persons are at risk. 
4.2. Flood estimation 
4.2.1. Flood estimation scenarios 
Three cases were analysed during the course of the investigation: 
(i) The inflows and outflows from Rosewood Detention Basin for the critical storm duration for 
the range of events from the 1 in 50 AEP event to the Probable Maximum Precipitation 
(PMP) event. 
(ii) The critical storm duration of the AEP event that just reaches the Dam Crest without wind, 
being the Dam Crest Flood (DCF). 
 (iii) The critical storm duration of the PMP design flood, without wind, behind an embankment 
high enough to avoid overtopping. 
Note: Critical storm duration is that which results in the maximum flood rise in the storage. 
 
From analysis of the scenarios, it was found that the AEP of the DCF is between the 1 in 1,000,000 
AEP event and the 1 in 1,355,000 AEP event. The basin has a discharge capacity during the DCF of 
124.1 m3/s (spillway) and 11.6 m3/s (pipe outlets), totalling 135.7 m3/s. The PMP has an AEP of 1 in 
1,355,000 and a peak inflow of 150.7 m3/s. 
4.2.2. Spillway adequacy assessment 
The PMP design flood results in a peak storage elevation of RL 81.71, so the dam crest (RL 81.70) 
would be overflowing. To contain the discharge in the spillway without this overflow, the embankment 
crest would have to be higher than a storage level of RL 81.74 at which the spillway discharge would 
be 132.8 m3/s. This value, together with the corresponding outlet discharge of 11.7 m3/s, is the 
Acceptable Flood Capacity discharge, totalling 144.5 m3/s. 
 
The corresponding PMF (required AFC event) inflow is 150.7 m3/s. The existing Dam Crest Flood 
capacity totals 135.7 m3/s (spillway and outlet). 
 
According to equation (1), the proportion of the Acceptable Flood Capacity discharged during the 
existing Dam Crest Flood for the Rosewood Detention Basin is: 
 
K (%) = 135.7/150.7 
 = 90% 
 
Based on the calculations, the required minimum flood discharge capacity is within Tranche 4 of the 
upgrade schedule in Appendix A and as such the acceptable flood capacity is to be achieved by 1 
October 2035. 
4.2.3. Freeboard allowances 
At maximum flood level the effective fetch is 234 m. The 1 in 100 AEP design mean wind speed is 
30 m/s, which corresponds to a wind gust critical duration of 5.7 minutes and produces a significant 
wave height of 0.36 m and a wind tide of 0.01 m. 
 
To accommodate wave action, a simple wall deflects waves with no run-up. The wind tide is 
accounted for by a small increase in the design crest level of the upgraded embankment. 
4.2.4. Upgrade proposals 
Rosewood detention basin was designed to pass the PMF without overtopping the embankment. The 
intended freeboard between the spillway and embankment crests was 2.0 m. The as-built survey 
disclosed that the spillway crest is 200 mm higher than the design level. Since the design, revised 
methods have revealed the PMF has increased and the basin cannot pass it without overtopping. The 
AFC study revealed that the AEP of the Dam Crest Flood without wave and wind tide allowances is 
between the 1 in 1,000,000 AEP and 1 in 1,355,000 AEP event. 
 
To upgrade the flood capacity involves: 
(i) raising the embankment crest by at least 50 mm, comprising 40 mm flood rise and 10 mm 
wind tide; and 
(ii) constructing a wave wall to 0.5 m higher than the final embankment crest, which is higher 
than the 1 in 100 AEP significant wave height 
 
In accordance with the AFC Guidelines, these works would be constructed at a time deemed suitable 
by Council but be completed no later than 1 October 2035. 
 
 In a preliminary analysis, the wave freeboard allowance was deducted from the available freeboard of 
1.8 m. This resulted in a current K value of 45% and would have meant that upgrades to achieve the 
AFC had to be in place by 1 October 2015. During subsequent discussion with the Regulator of a 
proposal to defer providing for wave freeboard, it was determined that the upgrade components could 
be undertaken over a period of 20 years. 
5. ACCEPTABLE FLOOD CAPACITY ASSESSMENT OF MARBURG 
DETENTION BASIN 
5.1. Background 
The Marburg Detention Basin, constructed in 2003/2004, is located on Black Snake Creek upstream 
of Rosewood–Marburg Road in the township of Marburg. 
 
The Marburg Detention Basin is intended to attenuate the 1 in 100 AEP flood to improve flood 
protection of the township. The basin is also classified as a Hazard Category 2 structure, with a PAR 
greater than 100. 
5.2. Flood estimation 
5.2.1. Flood estimation scenarios 
From analysis of the scenarios, it was found that the AEP of the DCF is the 1 in 1,000,000 AEP event 
with a discharge capacity of 365 m3/s (spillway) and 89 m3/s (outlets), totalling 454 m3/s. The PMP has 
an AEP of 1 in 10,000,000 and a peak inflow of 648 m3/s. 
5.2.2. Spillway adequacy assessment 
As the PMP results in a peak storage elevation of RL 89.51, the dam crest (RL 89.20) would be 
overflowing. To contain the discharge in the spillway without this overflow, the embankment crest 
would have to be higher than a storage level of RL 89.83, at which the spillway flow would be 
498 m3/s. This value, together with the corresponding outlet discharge of 110 m3/s is the Acceptable 
Flood Capacity discharge, totalling 608 m3/s. The corresponding PMF inflow is 648 m3/s. The existing 
Dam Crest Flood capacity is 454 m3/s (spillway and outlet). 
 
The proportion of the Acceptable Flood Capacity, as per equation (1), is: 
 
K (%) = 454/648 
= 70% 
 
As per the Schedule for Dam Safety Upgrades (see Appendix A), the current flood discharge capacity 
falls within Tranche 3 and accordingly the date by which the minimum flood capacity (75% of AFC) is 
to be achieved is 1 October 2025. The target for Acceptable Flood Capacity (Tranche 4) is 1 October 
2035. 
5.2.3. Freeboard allowances 
At maximum flood level the effective fetch is 763 m. The 1 in 100 AEP design mean wind speed is 32 
m/s, which corresponds to a wind gust critical duration of 12.2 minutes and produces a significant 
wave height of 0.70 m and a wind tide of 0.03 m. 
 
 To accommodate wave action, a simple wall deflects waves with no run-up. The wind tide is 
accounted for by a small increase in the design crest level of the upgraded embankment. 
5.2.4. Upgrade proposals 
At the time when the basin design was in progress and a failure impact assessment undertaken, the 1 
in 50,000 AEP flood event was proposed as the ALARP fall back. A higher embankment would have 
resulted in the inundation of upstream property whilst a longer spillway crest would have rendered the 
project unaffordable. The then NRM accepted this position. 
 
The basin performed satisfactorily during the 2008 floods, despite serious blockage of the pipe inlets 
due to collapsed perimeter fencing and prodigious inflow of debris. The partial blockage resulted in a 
600 mm storage rise above spillway crest level during an estimated 1 in 100 AEP flood. The basin 
performed without inlet blockage during the 2012 floods. 
 
To upgrade the flood capacity, the following options require evaluation: 
 
(a) raising the embankment by approximately 0.5m 
(b) raising the embankment by approximately 0.7m 
(c) providing a second spillway immediately east of the existing spillway and at the same 
crest level 
(d) a secondary spillway as for (c) but at a crest level up to 0.5m higher 
(e) combinations of the above, and 
(f) wave wall constructed to 1 m higher than the final embankment crest level. 
 
Table 2 shows tentative combinations and associated timescales to achieve required flood capacities. 
 
Table 2 Tentative combinations and associated timescales to achieve required flood capacities 
 
Option By 1 October 2025 By 1 October 2035 
a ✓  
b  ✓ 
a + (c or d)  ✓ 
f  ✓ 
 
A preliminary analysis in which the available freeboard of 2.5 m was reduced by the wave freeboard 
allowance resulted in a K value of 32%. This would have required a costly and major upgrade before 
1 October 2015. The Regulator agreed that the provision of wave freeboard could be postponed until 
2035, so that the upgrades could be staged and undertaken over a 20 year period as shown in 
Table 2. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Dam failures caused by inadequate spillway capacity account for only one third of all failures. Most 
upgrades of major dams in Australia have been driven by increases in PMP estimates. Careful design 
and diligent construction supervision are vital in preventing failures from other causes. 
  
Inevitably, the criteria for spillway capacity will be somewhat arbitrary, and whilst the ALARP principle 
allowed for negotiation with the Regulator, the AFC guideline appears to close off this option in the 
case of a new detention basin. The concentration of residents downstream of these detention basins 
leaves no case to argue against the requirements of the Dam Safety Regulator's guideline. This study 
has been a useful ‘road test’ of the new guideline. 
 
The current spillway capacities of Rosewood and Marburg Detention Basins are not acceptable in 
terms of the guidelines published since they were constructed. The upgrade of the Rosewood basin 
involves only minimal works and is not required until 2035. By contrast, the upgrading of the Marburg 
flood capacity requires major works to be completed in two stages by 2025 and 2035. Because the 
 regulator accepted that the wave freeboard need not be included in the assessment of current flood 
capacity relative to AFC, large immediate expenditure by Council has been avoided. 
  
Part of each final upgrade would involve the installation of a wave wall. If the ANCOLD guideline 
currently in preparation for detention basins waives the need for wave freeboard, then these walls 
need not be installed. 
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9. APPENDIX A 
Tranche Required minimum flood discharge capacity 
Date by which the required minimum flood 
capacity is to be in place for existing dams 
1 25% of AFC  
or 1:500 AEP flood event  
(whichever is the bigger flood) 
These dams must be upgraded as soon as 
possible 
2 50% of AFC  
or 1:2000 AEP flood event  
(whichever is the bigger flood) 
1 October 2015 
3 75% of AFC 1 October 2025 
4 100% of AFC 1 October 2035 
 
